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UNIFORMITY VERSUS UNIFORM LEGISLATION:
CONDITIONAL SALE OF FIXTURES
RALPIH N. KLEPS*
I.
A prominent attorney in New York City numbers among his best clients
a company which furnishes electric ranges, lighting fixtures, and wiring
installations for many of the large-scale construction projects being carried
out in that region and in the metropolitan areas of nearby New Jersey and
Pennsylvania. These construction materials are sold on credit in many
instances, and the conditional sale is the credit device by which the supply
house attempts to retain title to its goods as security for the payment of the
purchase price. These goods, however, are immediately delivered to the
buyer and installed in the buildings for which they are designed. In many
instances, the buildings are being financed on borrowed money, secured by
mortgages on the land. Installments on these loans are usually advanced
as the building nears completion, and the security relied on by the mortgagee
is the land and the completed structure. If the new venture prospers and
its debts are paid, the electrical company eventually collects the money due
it, and no difficulties ensue. In recent years, however, such projects have
often failed to achieve success, and the problem of the attorney for the
conditional seller has been to protect the interests of his client in the unpaid-
for articles against the desperate attempts of rival creditors to seize any
tangible assets which might be applied to the satisfaction of their claims.
In discussing this situation recently with a practicing lawyer from a
western state, the New York attorney mentioned the fact that his difficulties
are caused, not only by the uncertainty and complexity of the situation in
New York, but also by the fact that he is compelled to keep abreast of the
developments in the law of New Jersey and Pennsylvania, into which states
a considerable bulk of his client's products find their way. The western
lawyer consoled him as he said, "Even so, these three states have the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act in effect. Think how much worse your
situation would be if you had to handle this problem in my part of the
country where there is no such unifying link between the states !"
But to this the New York attorney replied, "I was handling cases of this
sort before the Uniform Act was passed; and you mark my words, I'm
no better off than I was twenty years ago. There are just as many elements
of diversity between the states today as there were then. And the situation
of the lawyer who is trying to comply with laws in all three states is probably
worse, because he may be lulled into false security by "the belief that uniformity
*The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance given him by Professor W. H.
Farnham, of the Cornell Law School, in the preparation of this article.
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does exist. No! The Uniform Act hasn't helped me a bit; in fact, I
suspect I'm worse off today than I was before the Act was passed."
II
The Uniform Conditional Sales Act was drafted to make uniform the
laws of the states which adopted it in the field of conditional sales, and
the hope was expressed that its adoption would result in "unification of
doctrine and decision".' The act was not widely adopted, but perhaps the
twenty years which have passed since its proposal have given a sufficient
perspective so that it is possible to answer the question implied by the
narrative related above. That is, what has been the effect of this uniform
legislation on the law of the states which adopted it? Has its adoption
resulted in any appreciable improvement in the direction of uniformity?
It is the purpose of this article to suggest an answer to these questions.
Practical considerations require that this paper be limited to a small portion
of the entire field covered by the Uniform Conditional Sales Act. It will,
therefore, be limited to the problem of our New York attorney in protecting
the conditional seller of articles which are attached to the realty; that is,
it will be confined to the situation arising upon the conditional sale of a
fixture.2
The conclusions which can be drawn from this study must be limited to
the field actually examined. Only a much more extended study could,
therefore, justify any conclusion as to the efficacy of uniform legislation in
general. But it is hoped that this paper will indicate the trend in one im-
portant field in which "uniform" legislation exists, and will, perhaps, suggest
the need for added investigation as to the efficacy of the Uniform State
Laws in producing uniformity.
III. SITUATION PRIOR TO THE UNIFOR i AcT
Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, our New
York attorney had three -important factors to consider within each of the
three states in determining the safety of his client's security when marketing
fixtures under conditional sale contracts: (1) the position taken generally
within the jurisdiction as to the validity of the contract of conditional
sale;3 (2) the position taken in the law of fixtures with regard to the
'Burdick, Codifying the Lrw of Conditional Sales (1918) 18 COL. L. kav. 103, 107.
'The use of the word "fixture" needs clarification. "Fixture" has been used loosely
to mean a variety of things. For example, it may mean a chattel so attached as
to become a part of the realty; or it may mean a chattel which, although attached
to realty, may be removed and is to be treated as personalty. Also it may mean a
chattel which may be either realty or personalty depending upon the intention of
the parties. It is in the latter sense that "fixture" is used here. See BRONsoN, LAw
OF FxTuREs (1904) § 3, p. 7; Bingham, Suggestions Concerning the Law of Fixtures
(1907) 7 COL. L. Rav. 1, 13.3At common law the contract of conditional sale was recognized in almost all
jurisdictions as being valid as between the parties to the contract. BOGART, COM-
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circumstances under which a chattel became a part of the realty to which
it was attached, that is, the circumstances under which an article would
become land if annexed in an unencumbered condition by an owner to his
own unencumbered land;- and (3) the statutory modifications within each
state which affected the two factors first mentioned. 5 Concerning each
of these elements there was some diversity among the jurisdictions, a diversity
which produced a considerable lack of uniformity in the decisions with regard
to the priority of the interests of competing claimants to the fixtures.6
1. It New York
Although New York recognized the validity of the conditional sales
contract, our attorney haat to remember two specific New York peculiarities
when advising as to the conditional sale of fixtures in New York prior
MENTARIES ON CONDITIONAL SALES (1924), 2a U. L. A. 55-56. The validity of the
contract of conditional sale was recognized in New York and New Jersey not only
against the conditional buyer, but also against his creditors and subsequent purchasers
of the chattel from him. Ballard v. Burgett, 40 N. Y. 314 (1869); Cole v. Berry, 42
N. J. L. 308, 34 Am. Rep. 511 (1880). See BOGERT, supra, at 58-59; Burdick, Codifying
the Law of Conditional Sales (1918) 18 COL. L. REv. 103. But in Pennsylvania the
conditional sale was valid only between the parties to the contract and was invalid
against third parties who dealt with the buyer. Martin v. Mathiot, 14 Serg. & Raw.
214, 16 Am. Dec. 491 (Pa. 1826). See BOGERT, supra, at 58-59; 3 JONES, CHATTEL
MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES (6th ed. by Bowers, 1933) § 905 pp. 7-8, n. 15.
Cf. Harkness v. Russell, 118 U. S. 663, 676, 7 Sup. Ct. 51, 59 (1886).
"All three jurisdictions adopted the principles stated in Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio
St. 511 (1853), that whether the chattel became a part of the realty to which it
was attached was to be determined from its annexation to the realty, the appropria-
tion to the ube of the realty, and the intention of the party making the annexation.
Tifft v. Horton, 53 N. Y. 377, 383 (1873) ; Brearly v. Cox, 24 N. J. L. 287 (1854) ;
Vail v. Weaver, 132 Pa. 363, 19 Atl. 138 (1890). See BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY
(1936) § 137, p. 628.
"New York passed a general filing statute applicable to conditional sales in Laws
-of 1884, Chap. 315, § 1. This afforded no protection to persons who acquired an
interest in the realty, since it was designed to protect subsequent purchasers of the
chattel itself. But Laws of 1904, Chap. 698 provided, ". . . Every such contract
for the conditional sale of any goods and chattels attached, or to be attached, to a
building, shall be void as against subsequent bona fide purchasers or encumbrancers
of the premises on which said building stands, and as to them the sale shall be
deemed absolute, unless . . . such contract shall have been. duly and properly filed and
indexed as directed ... " This filing requirement was later limited by decision to
situations where the articles were so attached as to have become part of the land.
Central Union Gas Co. v. Browning, 210 N. Y. 10, 103 N. E. 822 (1913). See Bogert,
Evolution of Conditional Sales Law in N. Y. (1923) 8 CORNELL L. Q. 303, 312-315.
New Jersey had passed several general filing statutes applicable to conditional sales
but none of them was designed to protect a person who acquired an interest in the
land. P. L. 1889, c. 271, p. 421; P. L. 1895,,c. 44, p. 302; P. L. 1898, c. 232, pp.
699-700. See Comp. Stat. of N. J. (1910), pp. 1561-1563, Tit. "Conveyances", §
71-73.
Pennsylvania had passed statutes the general effect of which was to change the
common law rule and to validate the conditional sale of fixtures provided there was
compliance with the terms of the statute. Laws of 1915, p. 866; Laws of 1923, p. 117.
See Burdick, Codifying the Law of Conditional Sales (1918) 18 COL. L. REv. 103.
£The diversity and uncertainty prevailing in this field of conditional sales has often'
been the subject of comment. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY (1936) §§ 152-155; 3 JONES,
CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES (6th ed. by Bowers, 1933) § 906;
Burdick, loc. cit. supra note 5, at 107.
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to the Uniform Act. One peculiarity existed in New York with regard
to the basic law of fixtures; for the New York courts tended to include
in the classification of inherent chattels, that is, objects which were incapable
of becoming realty despite their annexation to land, certain articles such
as gas fixtures and gas ranges which could conceivably have become part
of the land in other states.7
In addition, our attorney had to comply with the provisions of a New
York statute passed in 19048 and in effect until the adoption of the Uniform
Act, which required the contract for the conditional sale of chattels which
were to be attached to land to be filed in the city or county where the realty
was located. Failure to do so meant that the contract was void as against
"subsequent bona fide purchasers or incumbrancers of the realty".
a. Prior holders of a realty interest: Such persons were often either
holders of prior mortgages on the land, or sellers of land under installment
contracts who retained a vendor's lien on the land to which the fixtures were
subsequently attached. Against such persons our attorney could assure his
client that in New York the conditional sale would effectively protect his
interest in nearly every situation, and with no need to file under the "fixtures
statute". 9 " Only if his goods were so attached that removal would injure
the realty was his title reservation insecure against the holder of the prior
realty interest. 10 Thus, in this specific business, only in the wire installation
jobs might there be doubt as to the safety of the security when marketing
in New York under a conditional sale contract, for the court might hold
the wiring to have become inseparably part of the realty.
b. Subsequent holders of a realty interest: This class was composed of
persons who purchased the land, or took a mortgage on the land, or ad-
vanced further money under a pre-existing mortgage after the attaching
'Central Union Gas Co. v. Browning, 210 N. Y. 10, 103 N. E. 822 (1913) and the
cases discussed therein.
'Laws of 1904, c. 698, amending LIEN LAW § 112. Supra note 5.
'Davis v. Bliss, 187 N. Y. 77, 79 N. E. 851 (1907) (contract vendor of land);
DeBevoise v. Maple Ave. Constr. Co., 228 N. Y. 496, 127 N. E. 487 (1920) (prior
realty mortgagee); Ratchford v. Cayuga Co. Cold Storage, etc., Co., 217 N. Y. 565,
112 N. E. 447 (1916) (prior realty mortgagee). See (1921) 13 A. L. R. 448,
457 and 460.
An analogous situation arose where the conditional buyer was not the owner of
the land to which he attached the chattels, as for example, where a contractor pur-
chased fixtures conditionally and attached them without the knowledge of the owner of
the land. New York cases were in some confusion, but ultimately it was decided that
the same rule would apply as with the prior mortgagee of the realty. Crocker-
Wheeler Co. v. Genesee Recreation Co., 160 App. Div. 373, 145 N. Y. Supp. 477
(4th Dep't 1914), aff'd, 221 N. Y. 565, 116 N. E. 1042 (1917); Creamery Package
Mfg. Co. v. Horton, 178 App. Div. 467, 165 N. Y. Supp. 257 (3rd Dep't 1917).
"Cf. DeBevoise v. Maple Ave. Constr. Co., 228 N. Y. 496, 127 N. E. 487 (1920).
But if the prior mortgagee of the land made additional advances after the installation
of the fixtures and in reliance upon their presence, the courts gave him the status of
a subsequent mortgagee of the realty. Central Chandelier Co. v. Irving Trust Co.,
259 N. Y. 343, 182 N. E. 10 (1932) ; Cohoes Iron Foundry, etc., Co. v. Glavin, 190
App. Div. 87, 179 N. Y. Supp. 357 (3rd Dep't 1919).
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of the conditionally-sold fixture. The filing statute specifically required that
the contract be duly filed in the county where the land was located in
order for the conditional seller to be protected against persons in this class.
His client would be completely protected in marketing his goods by condi-
tional sale in New York (with the ever-present exception of goods which
could not be severed from the land without physical injury) oly if he had
complied with all the filing requirements,1 or if the holder of the realty in-
terest fell outside the protection of the filing statute, as for example, if he had
purchased the land with actual notice of the conditional seller's interest.1"
2. In New Jersey
In New Jersey, as in New York, the validity of the conditional sale
contract was recognized and New Jersey had the same common law back-
ground which existed in New York. But New Jersey had passed no statute
requiring the filing of conditional sales contracts for chattels to be attached
to land in the county where the land was located. Nor had New Jersey
courts actually rendered any decisions to the effect that there were certain
chattels which were incapable of becoming land even though attached to
the realty. The New Jersey cases followed the great case of Canpbell v.
Roddy, 3 and they held that the security interest of the conditional vendor
would be protected so long as removal would not diminish the security to
which the holder of the realty interest was entitled. And the latter was
held entitled only to the land as it was when he took his mortgage, plus
the interest of the mortgagor in any subsequent additions as that interest
accrued.14
'Cohoes Iron Foundry, etc., Co. v. Glavin, 190 App. Div. 87, 179 N. Y. Supp.
357 (3rd Dep't 1919) (subsequent mortgagee of the realty); Colwell Lead Co. v.
Home Title Ins. Co., 154 App. Div. 83, 138 N. Y. Supp. 738 (1st Dep't 1912), aff'd
without opinion, 208 N. Y. 591, 102 N. E. 1100 (1913) (subsequent purchaser of the
land); East N. Y. Refrig., etc., Co. v. Halpern, 140 App. Div. 201, 125 N. Y. Supp.
111 (2d Dep't 1910) (subsequent mortgagee). Cf. McCloskey v. Henderson, 231 N. Y.
130, 131 N. E. 865 (1921).
'See Fitzgibbons Boiler Co. v. Manhasset Realty Corp., 198 N. Y. 517, 92 N. E.
1084 (1910), reversing 125 App. Div. 764, 110- N. Y. Supp. 225 (1st Dep't 1908) on
the dissenting opinion of Scott, J. In Crocker-Wheeler Co. v. Genesee Recreation Co.,
160 App. Div. 373, 376, 145 N. Y. Supp. 477, 480 (4th Dep't 1914), aff'd, 221 N. Y.
565, 116 N. E. 1042 (1917), the court says that the filing statute is in derogation
of the common law and one seeking its protection has the burden of showing clearly
that he is within its terms.
"44 N. J. Eq. 244, 14 Atl. 279 (1888).
"'The New Jersey courts refused to adopt the New York position that an agreement
preserving the chattel nature of articles attached to land should be given legal effect
against both prior and subsequent mortgagees of the realty. It adopted as its solu-
tion the equitable principle that the chattel was removable so long as it did not diminish
the original security of the realty mortgagee. Cf. loc. cit. supra note 13, at 249.
It has been said that the protection of the conditional vendor's security in New Jersey
depended upon the "equitable doctrine" that he might, remove the fixture so long as
the interest of the mortgagee of the realty was not diminished, while the New York
,cases were said to rest upon a "legal doctrine" that the intention of the parties that
the chattel should remain personalty was controlling. EsTRIcH, INSTALLMENT SALES
(1926) § 130, p. 242; (1921) 13 A. L. R. 448, 460.
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a. Prior holders of a realty interest: The New York attorney could
safely advise his client that as to these persons the conditional sale would
effectively protect his security interest in New Jersey without compliance
with any special filing requirements applicable to fixtures. Only if the
removal of the articles attached would damage the security of the party
interested in the realty, that is, would cause physical harm to the realty
viewed as it originally was, might his security be jeopardized.Y5 This
situation was not materially different from the situation relating to prior
holders of a realty interest in New York.
b. Subsequent holders of a realty interest: Cases were few in New Jersey
prior to the adoption of the Uniform Act, but from them our attorney could
reasonably infer that if his client's goods were so attached as to become a
part of the land, he would be defeated by a subsequent bona fide purchaser
or mortgagee of the realty upon equitable considerations. That is, since the,
subsequent bona fide party bad reasonably relied upon the goods being a part
of the land, the conditional seller would not be heard to assert that they still
remained personal property.16 Only if the goods actually remained per-
sonalty, even though attached to the land, was the conditional seller's security
safe as against a subsequent bona fide taker of an interest in the land. No
opportunity was given him, as by filing in New York, to protect his interest
in chattels which had become a part of the land. Thus, there was a far
narrower protection available against subsequent holders of a realty interest
than that afforded in New York.
3. In Pennsylvania
In Pennsylvania, our attorney had two important peculiarities to remember.
The first was the fact that at common law the conditional sale was valid in
Pennsylvania only between the parties to the contract, even where no attach-
ment to realty was involved?.7  The other was the unusual length to which
Pennsylvania had developed the doctrine of constructive annexation in hold-
'"General Electric Co. v. Transit Equip. Co., 57 N. J. Eq. 460, 42 Atl. 101 (1898)
(prior realty mortgagee) ; Oil City Boiler Works v. N. J. Water & Light Co., 81
N. J. L. 491, 79 Atl. 451 (1910) (one in the position of a prior mortgagee of the realty) ;
Palmateer v. Robinson, 60 N. J. L. 433, 38 Ati. 957 (1897) (contract vendor of land).
"'In Campbell v. Roddy, 44 N. J. Eq. 244, 250, 14 Atl. 279, 282 (1888) the court said,
. . there seems to be no equitable ground upon which the lien of the chattel claimant
should be recognized against an innocent subsequent mortgagee or purchaser [of the
land] for value." This dictum was followed in Leo Co. v. Jersey City Bill Posting
Co., 78 N. J. L. 150, 73 At. 1046 (1909).
27Supra note 3. BOGERT, COMIMENTARIES ON CONDITIONAL SALES (1924), 2a U. L. A.
p. 58-59; BunDIcK, LAW oF SALEs (3rd ed. 1913) § 311, p. 218; 3 JONES, CHATTEL
MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES (6th ed. by Bowers. 1933) § 905, p. 7-8, n. 15.
Cf. Harkness v. Russell, 118 U. S. 663, 676, 7 Sup. Ct. 51, 59 (1886), where the Penn-
sylvania doctrine is said to result from a misconception of the English cases, which
depended upon a special statute, but were treated as though expressive of common law
principles.
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ing that light machinery and small tools essential to the functioning of a
manufacturing plant became a part of the realty even though not attached
to the land.' 8 On the other hand the statute in Pennsylvania operated to
-validate as against third parties the contract for the conditional sale of
fixtures when it was filed in express compliance with the provisions of
the statute.' 9
a. Prior holders of a realty interest: Our attorney could assure his client
that his security could be protected against these persons in Pennsylvania if
he complied with the statute, that is, filed his contract properly and posted a
bond to repair any material injury which removal might cause to a prior
mortgagee.2 0 But his security was safe only when the statute was specifically
followed.
b. Subsequent holders of a realty interest: The situation was the same here
as with the prior holder of the realty interest, except that no bond was
required. The security of the client would be safe only if the provisions of
the filing statute were met, that is, if the contract were properly filed prior
to the acquisition of any subsequent interest in the realty.2 '
4. Sunmziry of the situation prior to the Uniform Act
It is clear that there were many significant distinctions between the juris-
dictions here hastily reviewed. In New York the conditional seller had a
common law protection afforded him against the prior mortgage of the land,
and provided he complied with the filing statute, he could take advantage of
a statutory protection against subsequent purchasers or mortgagees of the
land. In New Jersey a similar common \law protection was afforded the
conditional seller where prior mortgagees of the land were involved, but
there was no statutory protection given as against subsequent holders of a
realty interest. In Pennsylvania, since these was no protection at common
law against any third parties, a statutory protection was granted, against
both prior and subsequent holders of a realty interest, to the conditional
'Bullock Electric Mfg. Co. v. Lehigh Valley Traction Co., 231 Pa. 129, 80 Atl.
568 (1911); Ott v. Sweatman, 166 Pa. 217, 31 At. 102 (1895).
'
9Ridgway Dynamo & Engine Co. v. Werder, 287 Pa. 358, 135 Atl. 216 (1926). Cf.
Anchor Concrete Mach. Co. v. Penna. Brick & Tile Co., 292 Pa. 86, 140 Atl. 766
(1928). Laws of 1923, p. 117, § 2.
'Laws of 1923, p. 117, § 2: ". . . Third. As against a prior mortgagee or other
prior incumbrancer of the realty, who has not assented to the reservation of property in
the chattels . .. the reservation of property in the chattels so attached shall be void, not-
withstanding the recording . . . unless such injury although material be such as can be
completely repaired, and the seller . . . furnishes or tenders . . . a good and sufficient
bond conditioned for the immediate making of such repairs. .. "
"Laws of 1923, p. 117, § 2: "... Second. As against a subsequent purchaser, subse-
quent mortgagee, or other subsequent incumbrancer, of the property for value and
without notice of the reservation of property in the chattels, such reservation shall
be void as to any chattels so attached to the realty as to form a part thereof, unless the
conditional sale contract . .. shall be recorded, as required . . . before such purchase
is made or such mortgage is given or such incumbrance is effected ......
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vendor who complied with the filing statute. And there were further differ-
ences which resulted from varying conceptions *as to what articles became
land and as to the circumstances required to produce that result.
These apparent differences were not necessarily productive of dissimilar
results in similar situations. The variations in the terms of the specific'
statutes, however, did provide an important element of diversity between
these states. Our investigation now proceeds to discover whether the unifica-
tion of the statutory requirements operated in fact to unify the ldw, i.e., the
"doctrine and decision", within these states, as it relates to the conditional
sale of fixtures.
IV. ADOPTION OF THE UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT
At Cleveland, Ohio, on August 26, 1918, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted a resolution approving "an
Act Concerning Conditional Sales and to Make Uniform the Law Relating
Thereto" and expressed the intention of presenting it to the various state
legislatures for enactment.22 This act was the result of an investigation
started in 1915 and was the third draft to be presented to the Commissioners.
It was the product of three years of earnest work by a distinguished and
learned group of lawyers and scholars.2
The proposed act provided in Section 4: "Every provision in a conditional
sale reserving property in the seller after possession of the goods is delivered
to the buyer, shall be valid as to all persons, except as hereinafter otherwise
provided." The Commissioners' note says that this merely states the general
rule of the common law, which is thus accepted by the statute.2 4
The situation here discussed is provided for by Section 7 of the proposed
act :25
"Section 7. [Fixtures.] If the goods are so affixed to the realty, at
the time of a conditional sale or subsequently as to become a part thereof
and not to be severable wholly or in any portion without material injury
to the freehold, the reservation of property as to any portion not so
severable shall be void after the goods are so affixed, as against any
person who has not expressly assented to the reservation.
"If the goods are so affixed to realty at the time of a conditional
sale or subsequently as to become a part thereof but to be sever-
able without material injury to the freehold, the reservation of
property shall be void after the goods are so affixed as against sub-
sequent purchasers of the realty for value and without notice of the
--2PROCEEDINGs, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMiISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws(1918) 356.
2'd. at 357-358.
1d. at 363; 2 U. L. A. Sec. 4, p. 6. However, it has already been pointed out that
this general common law rule was not followed in Pennsylvania as a matter of common
law. See supra note 17.2PROcEDINGS (1918) 366-367; 2 U. L. A., Sec. 7, p. 12.
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
conditional seller's title, unless the conditional sale contract, or a copy
thereof, together with a statement signed by the seller briefly describing
the realty and stating that the goods are or are to be affixed thereto,
shall be filed before such purchase in the office where a deed of the
realty would be recorded or registered to affect such realty.
"As against the owner of realty the reservation of the property in
goods by a conditional seller shall be void when such goods are to be
so affixed to the realty as to become a part thereof but to be severable
without material injury to the freehold, unless the conditional sale
contract, or a copy thereof, together with a statement signed by the
seller briefly describing the realty and stating that the goods are to be
affixed thereto, shall be filed before they are affixed, in the office where
a deed would be recorded or registered to affect such realty."
The Note to this section states that it is modeled in the main after similar
filing statutes in New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and Oregon.
26
It will be noted that this statute was made applicable only to articles which
would have become land if affixed by their owner to his own land, and thus
in all cases to be decided under the statute, there was preserved the difficult
question as to whether the chattel was so attached as to have become land.
Further, it will be seen that removability depends primarily upon whether
such removal causes "material injury to the freehold". If removal does
cause such injury, the first portion of Section 7 says that removal by the
conditional seller is possible only against a person who expressly assented to
such removal. This is, of course, merely a codification of the situation
which had formerly existed in New York as to articles which were con-
sidered to have become inseparably part of the realty, because removal would
cause physical injury to the land.
If the fixture has become part of the realty but is removable without ma-
terial injury, the second part of Section 7 says that the conditional sale
contract has to be filed where a deed affecting the realty would be filed in
order to be valid against a subsequent purchaser of the realty. Under
Section 1 "purchaser" includes "mortgagee" and "pledgee". This, too,
is very similar to the previous situation in New York. The third portion of
Section 7 provides for the special case where the conditional buyer affixes
the chattel to land which does not belong to him, for example, where a con-
tractor affixes conditionally-bought articles to the land of the one for whom
he is putting up the structure. In such case, filing prior to the attachment
of the chattel to the land is required.
This statute was adopted in New Jersey in 1919,27 in New York in 1922,28
and in Pennsylvania in 1925.29
oId. at 367; 2 U. L. A., p. 13.
-"P. L. 1919, c. 210; REV. STATUTES (1937) Tit. 46, c. 32, sec. 14.
'Laws of 1922, c. 642; PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 67.
2Laws of 1925, p. 603.
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V. SITUATION AFTER THE UNIFORM AcT
Let us return to our New York attorney and the problem which he faces
in endeavoring to protect the conditional seller of electrical fixtures who
markets goods throughout the states of New York, New Jersey and Penn-
sylvania. Is there any evidence supporting his suggestion that his position
has not improved in regard to uniformity despite the passage of the Uniform
Act?
1. In New York
New York has made only minor statutory changes in Section 7 since it
was adopted,30 and those are designed merely to clarify the original provi-
sions of the section. But New York has retained its former classification
of certain chattels which are incapable of becoming part of the land despite
annexation to the realty.31 This category was retained over strong judicial
protest,32 but New York has even tended to extend the group.33 Such
articles are exempt from filing under Section 7 since they are not attached
so as to becbme a part of the land no matter how apt they may be to
deceive third persons who become interested in the realty.3 4 In accordance
with previous decisions in New York, "material injury to the freehold"
has been interpreted to mean physical harm to the land, but no case has yet
been presented to the New York court in which such harm was found.
Most of the many decisions35 in New York since the Uniform Act was
'Laws of 1930, c. 874.
'Alf Holding Corp. v. American Stove Co., 253 N. Y. 450, 171 N. E. 703 (1930);
Madfes v. Beverly Develop. Corp., 251 N. Y. 12, 166 N. E. 787 (1929), in which
the court said at p. 15, "Certain chattels have such a determinate character as
movables that they remain personal property, after their annexation to real estate, inde-
pendently of any agreement . . . which so provides."
'Crane, J., dissenting in Madfes v. Beverly Develop. Corp., 251 N. Y. 12,. 166
N. E. 787 (1929), said at p. 21, "The gas range or cook stove and electric light
fixtures and ice boxes are now common in most every apartment . . . they are con-
sidered a part of the realty and are so treated by every owner and by the tenants....
The mortgagee would be startled if all the ranges and radiators were removed by the
mortgagor." And again at p. 23, "To me it is quite evident that ... cook stoves and
ranges placed in the ordinary apartment house . . . form 'a part of the realty'; they
are goods which are so affixed to the realty as to become a part thereof, . . . within
the meaning of Section 67. .. ." [Section 7 of Uniform Act.]
'Kommel v. Herb-Gner Constr. Co., 256 N. Y. 333, 176 N. E. 413 (1931) (lighting
fixtures); Blumberg v. 4602-14th Ave. Corp., 232 App. Div. 844, 248 N. Y. Supp.
751 (2d Dep't 1931) (electrical fixturesj; Chasnov v. Marlane Holding Co., 137
Misc. 332, 244 N. Y. Supp. 455 (Mun. Ct., N. Y. 1930) (refrigerators); Kelvinator
Sales Corp v. Byro Realty Corp., 136 Misc. 720, 241 N. Y. Supp. 632 (City Ct. N. Y.
1930) (refrigerators).
However, two recent cases may be cited as indicating a tendency to limit, rather
than extend, the category of articles which are inherent chattels despite annexation
to land. Lightolier Co. v. Del Mar Club Holding Co., 237 App. Div. 432, 262 N. Y.
Supp. 32 (1st Dep't 1933), aff'd, 263 N. Y. 588, 189 N. E. 711 (1934) (electric light
fixtures held not to be inherent chattels) ; Voss v. Melrose Bond & Mortgage Corp.,
160 Misc. 30, 298 N. Y. Supp. 576 (Mun. Ct. N. Y. 1936) (refrigerating plant held
not determinate personalty).
"'Madfes v. Beverly Develop. Corp., 251 N. Y. 12, 166 N. E. 787 (1929).
'See, N. Y. CONSOLIDATED LAWS ANN. (McKinney 1938) PERSONAL PROPERTY LA-W,§ 67, pp. 265-276.
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adopted have been concerned with the judicial construction of specific terms
of the statute. In regard to some of them there is little unanimity of
opinion even among the New York courts, without regard to the situation
in other states.386
a. Against a prior holder of a realty interest: Our attorney will find
in New York that the conditional sale is effective to protect his client's
security against prior mortgagees of the land with no need to file the
contract under the "fixtures section".3 7 Only in the event that the removal
of the article will cause material physical injury to the land must some
extra precaution be taken, and then only the express assent of the. person
against whom the removal is sought to be enforced will suffice.
b. Against a subsequent holder of a realty interest: Against such persons
the contract of conditional sale is effective to protect his client's security in
an article which has become a part of the land only if the contract is filed
'What constitutes "material injury to the freehold"? No case has been found in
New York where the court held that removal of the conditionally-sold articles would
cause material injury. Typical examples: Harvard Financial Corp v. Greenblatt
Constr. Co., 261 N. Y. 169, 184 N. E. 748 (1933) (elevators held removable without
material injury even though beams had to be taken out also) ; Metropolitan Stone
Works v. Probel Holding Corp., 131 Misc. 519, 227 N. Y. Supp. 414 (City Ct. N. Y. 1928)
(concrete fountain and flower boxes held removable without material injury) ; Modern
Security Co. v. Thwaites, 138 Misc. 469, 246 N. Y. Supp. 405 (Sup. Ct. 1930) (heat-
ing system held removable, even though it would leave holes in the ceilings); Prisco
& Soverio v. Bifulco Bros., 234 App. Div. 122, 254 N. Y. Supp. 459 (2d Dep't 1931)
(kitchen cabinets, though attached to walls of 'apartment house by nails) ; Prudence-
Bonds Corp. v. 1000 Island House Co., 141 Misc. 39, 252 N. Y. Supp. 60 (Sup.' Ct.
1930) (sprinkler system, though removal would leave holes).
Who is a "subsequent bona fide purchaser of the realty, for value and without
notice"? Kohler v. Brasun, 249 N. Y. 224, 164 N. E. 31 (1928) (purchaser at the
foreclosure of a prior realty mortgage, held a subsequent bona fide purchaser of the'
land); Harmony Realty Co. v. Bronxwick Holding Corp., 137 Misc. 16, 242 N. Y.
Supp. 125- (Sup. Ct. 1930) (one who subordinates his mortgage to a subsequent one
after the installation of fixtures,- said not to be a subsequent bona fide purchaser of
the land), cf. concurring opinion by Hogan, J., in McCloskey v. Henderson, 231 N. Y.
130, 131 N. E. 865 (1921); Central Chandelier Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 259 N. Y.
343, 182 N. E. 10 (1932) (prior mortgagee who advanced money after fixtures in-
stalled, held a subsequent bona fide party). But see Greater N. Y. Develop. Co. v.
Ka-ro Bldg. Corp., 256 N. Y. 657, 177 N. E. 181 (1931) (mortgagee who extends
time on his mortgage after the installation of fixtures, held not a subsequent bona fide
purchaser of the land).
What is the effect of a clause in a realty mortgage to the effect that "all articles of
personal property now or hereafter attached to the land" shall be subject to the
mortgage? Such a clause in a subsequent realty mortgage has been held to make
the realty mortgagee also a bona fide purchaser of the conditionally-sold articles as
chattels. Cohen v. 1165 Fulton Ave. Corp., 251 N. Y. 24, 166 N. E. 792 (1929);
Kommel v. Herb-Gner Constr. Co., 256 N. Y. 333, 176 N. E. 413 (1931); cf. Alf
Holding Corp. v. American Stove Co., 253 N. Y. 450, 171 N. E. 703 (1930). But
such a clause in a prior realty mortgage cannot aid the land mortgagee since he
can in no way be considered a subsequent purchaser of the chattels. N. Y. Title &
Mort. Co. v. Mapark Holding Co., 236 App. Div. 219, 258 N. Y. Supp. 378 (1st Dep't
1932); Perfect Lighting Fixtures v. Grubar Realty Corp., 228 App. Div. 141, 239
N. Y. Supp. 286 (1st Dep't 1930).
mThe statute expressly names "subsequent purchasers of the realty" as the group
against whom filing is required in order to protect the conditional seller's interest.
Cf. Greater N. Y. Develop. Co. v. Ka-ro Bldg. Corp., 256 N. Y. 657, 177 N. E. 181 (1931).
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properly before the acquisition of such a subsequent interest in the realty.38
If removal cannot be accomplished without material injury to the freehold,
the express assent of the person against whom it is sought to be enforced is
required. However, the recognition of a category of chattels in New York
which cannot become a part of the realty even though attached to it means
that, as to such goods, the contract of conditional sale will protect his client's
security even against subsequent parties with no need to file under Section 7.39
Our attorney, however, will have some difficulty in deciding which of the
articles sold by his client will fall under the category of inherent chattels
in New York.40
2. In New Jersey
New Jersey has made no statutory alteration in the section since it was
adopted; nor have its decisions definitely marked out a category of chattels
which are exempt from filing under Section 7 because they are incapable
of becoming part of the land even though attached to it. Its chief variation
has been the totally unexpected adoption of a broad interpretation of
"material injury to the freehold". The New Jersey courts have committed
themselves to ihe proposition that "material" means more than "physical
injury", despite the indicated intention of the drafters of the Act and pre-
vious New York decisions which had purported to define the phrase.41
"Material injury" is said to be caused by the removal of any chattel which
is permanently 'essential to the completeness of the structure and the func-
tioning of it. If the severance will prevent the structure from being used
for the purposes for which it was intended, then the chattel is not re-
movable without material injury to the freehold.42 This interpretation neces-
'Supra note 37. Harvard Financial Corp. v. Greenblatt Constr. Co., 261 N. Y. 169,
184 N. E. 748 (1933) ; Kohler v. Brasun, 249 N. Y. 224, 164 N. E. 31 (1928).
'Supra notes 31 and 34.
'
0Supra note 33.
'The intention of the drafters of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act was to
perpetuate the common law rule, as applied in New York, that removal would not be
allowed where the article conditionally sold was so closely incorporated with the realty
that removal would seriously injure the land. See BoGERT, COMMENTARIES ON CON-
DITrONAL SALES (1924), 2a U. L. A. 98-99, § 66. Other states in applying the Uni-
form Act have given effect to the intention of the drafters 'of the Uniform Act
by holding that "material injury to the freehold" means physical injury to .the land.
Harvard Financial Corp v. Greenblalt Constr. Co., 261 N. Y. 169, 184 N. E. 748 (1933) ;
People's Savings & Trust Co. v. Munsert, 212 Wis. 449, 249 N. W. 527 (1933).
Cf. Treat v. Nowell, 37 Ariz. 290, 294 Pac. 273 (1931) ; Industrial Bank of Richmond
v. Holland Furnace Co., 109 W. Va. 176, 153 S. E. 309 (1930).
'This doctrine, which has been called "the institution theory of material injury",
bears certain resemblances to the long-standing Pennsylvania doctrine as to machinery
essential to manufacturing plants. See supra note 18.
The doctrine was announced in New Jersey by way of dictum in Future Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Mazzocchi, 107 N. J. Eq. 422, 152 Atl. 776 (1931). Since then it has
been adopted and developed by the Court of Errors and Appeals in Domestic Electric
Co. v. Mezzaluna, 109 N. J. Eq. 574, 162 Atl. 722 (1932) ; Russ Distributing Corp. v.
Lichtman, 111 N. J. L. 21, 166 Atl. 513 (1933) ; Lumpkin v. Holland Furnace Co.,
118 N. J. Eq. 313, 178 Atl. 788 (1935) ; Smyth Sales Corp. v. Norfolk Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n, 116 N. J. L. 293, 184 At. 204 (1936).
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sitates express assent of the holder of the realty interest in many situations
where the statute intended proper filing to be a complete protection despite
the fact that the seller's articles had become part of the land. Under this
interpretation the conditional seller of goods which may be held essential to
the functioning of the institution can protect his security only by obtaining
the express assent of any party against whom he may seek to remove the
goods. The practical difficulties in obtaining such assent from all prior
holders of a realty interest are great; those involved in attempting to get
express assent from all who might subsequently acquire a realty interest
are insurmountable. 43
a. Against prior holders of a realty interest: As in New York, our attorney
will find that the conditional sale is effective to protect his client's security
against prior parties with no need to file under the "fixtures statute".4L
But the extended definition of "material injury to the freehold" in New
Jersey means that nothing short of express assent will protect his client's
security in any situation where the articles might be held essential to the
functioning of the institution. 45  The difficulty in which this places our
New York attorney can be appreciated only by a realization of the fact
that it is extremely difficult to determine what articles the New Jersey courts
will include within the operation of their "institution theory of material
injury", and consequently, in what instances express assent is the only
adequate protection. 46
b. Against subsequent holders of a realty interest: If the article is so
attached as to have become a part of the land, our attorney can protect his
"See (1937) 22 CORNELL L. Q. 421, criticizing the extension of the institution theory
of material injury in New Jersey and suggesting that the impossibility of obtaining
express assent may force the abandonment of the conditional sale in merchandising
these goods. See also (1938) 23 CORNELL L. Q. 324.
"Supra note 37. Reliable Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Purifoy, 111 N. J. Eq. 575, 163
At. 151 (1932).
'Such instances of "material injury to the freehold" have been found with startling
ease in New Jersey, particularly when contrasted with the fact that no New York
case has found such injury. A fairly complete list of New Jersey cases which find such
material injury that the conditional seller could not have been protected in the absence
of express assent follows: Domestic Electric Co. v. Mezzaluna, 109 N. J. Eq. 574,
162 Atl. 722 (1932) (refrigerating equipment); Fidelity Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Elizabeth Ave. Holding Co., 119 N. J. Eq. 11, 180 Atl. 881 (1935) ; Future Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Mazzocchi, 107 N. J. Eq. 422, 152 Atl. 776 (1931) (refrigerators,
gas ranges, cabinets) ; Lumpkin v. Holland Furnace Co., 118 N. J. Eq. 313, 178 Atl.
788 (1935) (pipeless heating system in a house) ; MacLeod v. Satterthwait, 109
N. J. Eq. 414, 157 Atl. 670 (1932), aff'd, 113 N. J. Eq. 238, 166 Atl. 163 (1933)
(refrigerating system) ; Russ Distributing Corp. v. Lichtman, 111 N. J. L. 21, 166 At.
513 (1933) (refrigerating system); Smyth Sales Corp. v. Norfolk Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n, 116 N. J. L. 293, 184 Atl. 204 (1936) (heating system in a house). See,
Layne New York Co. v. President H6fel Co., 111 N. J. L. 338, 168 Atl. 442 (1933)
(well and pumping equipment); Mugler Auto Pit Co. v. Tide Water Oil Co.,
14 N. J. Misc. 471, 185 AtI. 542 (1936) (garage auto-greasing pit).
"See (1938) 23 CORNELL L. Q. 324, indicating the uncertainty of the conditional
seller in New Jersey and the difficulty in estimating what articles will come under
the operation of the "institution theory."
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client's security only by filing properly before the acquisition of any subse-
quent interest in the land.47  But again the extended definition of "material
injury to the freehold" in New Jersey may mean that nothing short of
express assent will protect his client's security if the articles are such as to
be held essential to the functioning of the institution.
3. In. Peynsylvania
Pennsylvania has furnished the logical extreme in this development toward
non-uniformity by substituting its own version of a "fixtures section" in place
of Section 7 of the Uniform Act. Great uncertainty seems to have charac-
terized the actions of the Pennsylvania legislature; two days after they had
adopted the Uniform Act on May 12, 1925,48 they re-enacted the prior
Pennsylvania conditional sales legislation in regard to fixtures.49  In 1927,
they amended Section 7 of the Uniform Act so that it contained the essentials
of the prior Pennsylvania legislation and then repealed their extra statute.50
Finally, in 1935, they enacted Section 7 in its present form,51 leaving out
of the new section the difficult phrase concerning "material injury to the
freehold". The present statute provides that the conditional vendor of
fixtures who has properly filed his contract can always remove his goods.
But he may be required to post a bond to repair any damage caused to
the interest of "an owner or prior encumbrancer" upon demand by such a
"'Supra note 37. Sellitto v. Heating & Plumbing Finance Corp., 116 N. J. Eq. 247,
174 Atl. 147 (1934), aff'd, 117 N. J. Eq. 19, 174 Atl. 708 (1934).
"Laws of 1925, p. 603 (May 12, 1925).
"Laws of 1925, p. 722 (May 14, 1925). In Beloit Iron Wks. v. Lockhart, 294
Pa. 376, 144 Atl. 283 (1928) it was said that the old statute, re-enacted, applied to
"machinery" to be attached to realty, and that the Uniform Act, § 7, applied to
other articles attached to realty.
'Laws of 1927, p. 979.
'Laws of 1935, p. 658; PENNA. STATUTES ANN. (Purdon, 1938 Supp.) § 404: "Goods
to be affixed to realty shall not become a part of the said realty, or of the freehold
to which they are attached or are to be attached, or of any operating plant of which
they may form a part, but shall be treated as severable and subject to removal as
against the conditional vendee, his heirs, executor, administrator, successors and assigns,
and, also, as against any mortgagee, encumbrancer, owner, purchaser or other persons
having any interest in or liens against such real property or freehold, until the
unpaid balance due . . . has been paid if, prior to the said affixing or attaching of
the goods to the realty, the conditional sale contract or a copy thereof . . . shall have
been filed. . . . Provided, however, if an owner or prior encumbrancer of the said
realty shall demand a bond to protect him against loss resulting from damage which
may be caused to the land or to the physical structure of the buildings . . . the
conditional seller or his successor in interest shall deliver . . . a good and sufficient
bond, conditioned for the immediate making of such repairs ......
The Pennsylvania courts had reaffirmed the old doctrine with regard to machinery
in manufacturing plants in Central Lithograph Co. v. Eatmore Chocolate Co., 316
Pa. 300, 175 Ati. 697 (1934) and had extended the doctrine to include a furnace
in a house in Holland Furnace Co. v. Suzik, 118 Pa. Super. 405, 180 Atl. 38 (1935).
This was, in effect, a position similar to that of New Jersey under its "institution
theory". See (1935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 916, 917. It might be suggested that the
new statute in Pennsylvania in 1935 was designed to avoid the consequences which
would have followed such an interpretation if Sec. 7 of the Uniform Act had been
retained there.
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prior party. Failure to file would subject the conditional seller to the rights
of any party interested in the realty in a situation where the goods would
be held to have become part of the realty.
a. Against prior holders of a realty interest: In contradistinction to
the situation in both New York and New Jersey, our attorney will find
that he must file the contract of conditional sale in Pennsylvania, even
against prior mortgagees of the land. And in the event that removal might
cause physical injury to the land, his client may be required to put up a
bond to compensate for the injury caused. However, proper filing and com-
pliance with the statute will adequately protect his client's security in all
instances in Pennsylvania.
b. Against subsequent holders of a realty interest: Proper filing under
the "fixtures statute" will protect the client's security in Pennsylvania as
to such subsequent mortgagees without regard to ease of removal and
without reference to difficult tests such as material injury to the freehold.
VI. SUMMARY
It will be seen that our New York attorney, in advising the conditional
seller of electric ranges and lighting equipment who distributes them through-
out the area bounded by the three states of New York, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania has a difficult task in determining what steps he should
take in each jurisdiction and in deciding how safe his client's security
will be. It will be remembered that, prior to the adoption of the Uniform
Act,. New York and New Jersey extended similar common law protection
to the conditional seller as against prior mortgagees of the land, while
only New York granted him the privilege of protecting his security by filing
his contract as against subsequent purchasers and mortgagees where his
article became part of the land. It will further be remembered that the
Pennsylvania statute granted protection only upon proper filing and com-
pliance with the statute in all situations, whether prior or subsequent holders
of a realty interest were involved.
By the adoption of Section 7 of the Uniform Act the three states involved
destroyed the differences indicated above. In addition, they standardized
the requirement for the filing in the county where the land was located
of any contract for the conditional sale of an article so attached to land as
to become a part thereof. However, although a step toward uniformity was
taken by the adoption of the Uniform Act, it is apparent that that step- has
followed by a series of backward steps leading in the direction of non-
uniformity.
In New York the common law protection against prior mortgagees of
the land and the privilege of acquiring protection, by proper filing, against
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subsequent purchasers and mortgagees has continued much as it was prior
to the Uniform Act. But New York's retention of its category of inherent
chattels, which makes it unnecessary to file contracts affecting such articles
under Section 7, is an element productive of non-uniformity. The conditional
seller in New York must determine whether to file his contract under the
realty records, thus making the assumption that it is so attached as to have
become a part of the land, or whether to file it under the chattel records,
thus making the assumption that it continues to be a chattel despite its
attachment to land. Such a determination is impossible in the absence of
court decision; and filing under both chattel and realty records, while a
practical rule of thumb with which to extricate the conditional seller from his
dilemma, is hardly conducive to uniformity in this field among the three
states.
In New Jersey the original element of diversity was eliminated by the
adoption of the Uniform Act; and Section 7 now purports to afford the
same sort of protection against prior holders of the realty interest and
against subsequent holders which is available in New York. However, the
adoption of the "institution theory of material injury" in New Jersey,
coupled with the provision of Section 7 that express assent is required against
any holder of a realty interest where removal of the article causes material
injury, has resulted in a very narrow protection indeed being afforded to
the conditional seller in New Jersey. For if his articles are apt to fall under
the operation of the institution theory, a determination which he must make
in advance and at his peril, nothing can protect the conditional seller's
security except the express assent of the party against whom he may later
wish to remove it. Only if the conditional seller can be sure that his articles
fall outside the operation of the institution theory can he be assured of the
protection against prior parties and against subsequent parties which is
given in New York, and which Section 7 appears to give him in New Jersey.
In Pennsylvania the standardization produced by the adoption of the Uni-
form Act has been converted by a series of events into a situation almost
parallel in lack of uniformity to the situation which existed prior to the
adoption of the Act. In its attempt to avoid the consequences of the
courts' acceptance of the institution theory, so clearly exemplified in New
Jersey, the Pennsylvania legislature has so amended Section 7 that it bears
no resemblance to the section recommended by the Uniform Act. The
differences produced by this amendment may be summarized by saying that
filing is required in any situation where the article is attached to the land,
and in addition a bond may be required to compensate prior holders of a
realty interest where physical injury is caused by removal. This affords a
statutory protection for the conditional seller in all situations provided he
complies with the statute; but, however admirable the Pennsylvania version
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of Section 7 may be on its merits, it contributes much toward the re-
creation of the sort of non-uniformity which existed twenty years ago.
It is the thesis of this paper that the situation which obtains today in
the jurisdictions here studied presents little improvement in regard to
uniformity despite the adoption of the Uniform Act. While this is not the
place -in which to attempt to define the reasons for the failure of the Act
to produce uniformity, it might be suggested that the situation is due to
the inherent difficulties in attempting to make uniform a law concerning
which there are separate tribunals of highest appeal in the separate juris-
dictions. The situation which exists today is characterized by the refusal of
courts in the different states to follow the same interpretation of the Uniform
Act, and by the freedom of any state to change the act, either in adopting
it or subsequently, without regard to the situation in other states. These
inescapable prerogatives of free sovereignty have operated in this instance
practically to negatice the laudable attempt to bring about a condition of
uniformity in the law regarding conditional sale of fixtures.
It is submitted that, either by the process of judicial interpretation or by
legislation alteration, the hopes with which the Uniform Conditional Sales
Act was adopted have been defeated. It cannot be said, twenty years
after the proposal of the Uniform Act, that any substantial unification of
"doctrine and decision" has resulted within the states here studied and
with regard to the problem considered. Our New York attorney has a
respectable amount of evidence with which to support his assertion that his
situation today shows no improvement with regard to uniformity. Can it be,
perhaps, that Uniform State Laws do not furnish a practicable solution for
the lack of uniformity found within our system of independent state
sovereignties ?
